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I. Introduction
Companies, government agencies, and other organiza-
tions have been analyzing data pertaining to their internal
operations with great effect, such as in evaluating perfor-
mance or improving efficiency. While each organization’s
own data is valuable internally, aggregate data from mul-
tiple organizations can have value to the organizations
themselves, policymakers, and society. Unfortunately, an
organization’s data is often proprietary and confidential,
and its release may be potentially deleterious to the
organization’s interests. Secure multi-party computation
(MPC) resolves this tension: aggregate data may be com-
puted while protecting each contributor’s confidentiality.
Theoretical constructs have been known for decades [1]–[3]
and recent efforts aim to deliver them to end-users [4]–[6].
II. Scenario and Requirements
The Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC) ini-
tiated a study of gender and ethnicity wage gaps among
employers within the Greater Boston Area; compensation
data must to be collected from privately held companies
in order to calculate an aggregate statistic (sum) over
the data. Each company submits employee earnings ag-
gregated by gender and job category. BWWC may view
the aggregate totals across all companies, but individual
company numbers must remain private.
We implemented and deployed an MPC protocol as a
web-based service to compute the statistic without requir-
ing the companies to trust BWWC or Boston University
(BU) with sensitive data. The user interface provides a
familiar spreadsheet that can be filled with data manually
or via copy-paste. We successfully deployed this service
twice (in 2015 and 2016) to analyze compensation data
from a collection of 40–70 employer organizations [7].
We consider three roles in the deployed protocol: (1)
an unknown quantity of contributors who contribute pri-
vate data for the calculation; (2) an automated, publicly-
accessible service provider that sees only encrypted data
and connects all other participants without requiring them
to maintain servers (or even to be online simultaneously);
and (3) one or more analyzers who receive the output
of the analytic. For an outline of the protocol we refer
the reader to the Appendix. Several security and usability
considerations drove protocol design and implementation.
Security: We rely on MPC with passive (semi-honest)
security and without collusion [8]. This suffices in our
scenario because the service provider and analyzer lack
incentives to falsify the results or to learn private inputs:
completing the study successfully is directly beneficial to
BWWC (as the study initiator) and to BU (as an institu-
tion reliant upon a reputation of integrity). Additionally,
obtaining any private contributor data (by colluding or
actively deviating from the protocol) creates a liability
risk for the service provider and analyzer. The semi-
honest model is natural in this case: service providers are
protected from the legal risks of processing sensitive data
if the protocol is followed.
Usability: A secure MPC protocol only has value if
multiple parties trust it and use it. The pay equity scenario
involves individuals with a wide range of technical back-
grounds utilizing computing resources that are outside of
our control and governed by a variety of organizational
constraints. Thus, our protocol and web service must
satisfy many usability goals: comprehensibility (to drive
adoption); transparency (open-source code); easy deploya-
bility (no specialized software, hardware, synchronization,
or continuous network access); idempotent resubmission;
input validation in the client interface; and others [9].
Off-the-shelf Tools: The past few years have seen several
successful deployments of MPC [10]–[12] and a number
of software frameworks are available [4]–[6], though they
fall short of meeting our usability requirements (e.g.,
non-expert comprehensibility and easy deployability). Our
full technical report [9] provides a thorough evaluation
of existing frameworks (e.g., VIFF and Sharemind) and
their limitations in this context, including assembly of
exploratory prototypes using such existing frameworks.
III. Deployment and Future Vision
Practical deployment difficulties included browser and
OS incompatibilities, human errors and associated support
activities, and scheduling of the data collection; perfor-
mance was not an issue given the procotol and scale of data
[9]. The simplicity of the protocol and implementation
helped decision makers feel confident that they adequately
understood their operation, security guarantees, and risks.
Informed by our experience, we envision an MPC-as-
a-service platform that provides powerful computing and
networking capabilities to “thin client” users (having noth-
ing more than a web browser) such that trust is inversely
proportional to computing power. The security community
can support use cases such as ours by combining MPC and
cloud computing in a unique way that allows the most
powerful computing entity to be the least trusted.
Appendix
The protocol developed for this application is a variant
of a technique that allows multiple parties to securely
compute a sum of their private inputs [13], though the
naïve secure sum protocol could not be deployed as-is:
• participants must pass data along in sequence, re-
quiring a sophisticated software infrastructure involv-
ing multiple client/server applications communicating
with one another and maintaining state;
• participants must run the application for the duration
of the computation (spanning hours or days); and
• if one participant makes an error and wishes to resub-
mit, the entire protocol would need to be restarted
because updates are not idempotent.
These requirements are avoided in the adjusted protocol.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of protocol deployment for two contributors used to
explain the protocol to potential participants.
Let G be an appropriate additive group such as Z/264Z
and distinguish each contributor using an index i ∈
{1, ..., n}. A single session (execution) proceeds as follows:
1. the analyzer initiates the process by generating a
secret and public RSA key pair (s, p) sending p to
the service provider and all the contributors;
2. each of the n contributors possesses a secret data
value di ∈ G and does the following at least once:
a. generates a secret random mask mi ∈ G and
calculates the masked data ri = di +mi, and
b. sends ri unencrypted to the service provider and
uses p to send an encrypted mask ci = Encp(mi);
3. the service provider computes the aggregate of the
masked data R =
∑n
i=1 ri;
4. the analyzer then retrieves R and all the c1, . . . , cn
from the service provider, computes mi = Decs(ci)
for all i, computes M =
∑n
i=1mi, and obtains the
final result R−M =∑ni=1 di.
The service provider never sees the masks because they
are encrypted, and the analyzer never sees the individual
masked data values unless it colludes with the service
provider. Our protocol guarantees that any malicious
outsider that can observe and store all communications
between all participants will gain no information beyond
the aggregate being computed. We exploit this when
deploying: the server housing the data can be commodity
hardware purchased from any third-party provider.
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